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NOTES
EXTENT OF PRIVATE RIGHTS IN NONNAVIGABLE LAKES
There are some 30,000 lakes and ponds in Florida-more than in
any other state in the Union., A glance at a detailed map of this
state is sufficient to disclose the relatively large portion of land lying
beneath Florida lakes. With the discovery of oil deposits and the increasing exploration for more, title to subaqueous property is growing in importance to landowners whose property is contiguous to
lakes, whether navigable or nonnavigable. In addition to mineral
rights in the subaqueous soil, rights to use the waters of the lake for
boating, fishing, and bathing are equally valuable in many areas.
The purpose of this note is to examine the principles relating to the
ownership of lake beds. The complexity of the law relating to each
of the several aspects of this general field necessitates limitation of
the bulk of the discussion here to the ownership of the beds of non2
navigable lakes and the rights incident to such ownership
THE COMMON LAW

Although considerable confusion existed in the early English law
regarding the ownership of land under the sea and rivers,3 the law
with reference to England's lakes was somewhat clearer. The relatively few decisions, 4 though failing to answer unequivocally many related questions, indicate that the beds of both navigable and nonnavigable lakes were freely granted by the Crown to private owners. An

lMoRus, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 70 (3d ed. 1952).
2Properly speaking, those inherent rights arising out of ownership of property
abutting on a stream or river are "riparian" rights, while those incident to ownership of land contiguous to a lake or sea are "littoral" rights, Mobile Dry Docks Co.
v. Mobile, 146 Ala. 198, 40 So. 205 (1906); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W.
617 (1914). The opinions, however, generally ignore this distinction, e.g., Hardin
v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Tilden v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 113 So. 708 (1927);
Richardson v. Sims, 118 Miss. 728, 80 So. 4 (1918). Accordingly, the term "riparian" is here used throughout to embrace both concepts.
3See 1 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 166-172 (1904).
4There were apparently none of import prior to the American Revolution;
see, e.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 65, 148 N.W. 617, 619 (1914).
5
Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641 (1878); Marshall v. Ulleswater Steam

[1661
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express grant conveyed title to the bed of even a navigable lake; 6
but the applicability of the presumption that a conveyance of riparian
land carries with it title to the center of the lake was disputed 7 on
the theory that the proprietor of a few acres fronting on a lake was
not entitled to a piece of the bed many times the size of his upland
property. The early cases do not decide whether the public had an
easement to navigate or fish in the waters of a navigable lake overlying private land.8
American jurisdictions, generally in an effort to vary the rights
in the bed and waters of their lakes in favor of the state and its people,
have declined to follow the common law in many respects. The states
have variously held or asserted that the state has title to the
bed of all navigable waters either in a proprietary capacity 9 or in a
sovereign capacity in trust for the people,1 or that the riparian proprietors can acquire any navigable inland waters," or that the state
owns the bed of navigable lakes while the riparian owners can obtain
title to the bed of navigable rivers.1 2 Still others have said that if
the lake is meandered 13 by government survey the title to the bed is
in the state regardless of navigability. 4 Treatise writers have much
belabored the distinctions and the reasoning involved in the various
holdings.
Some courts have observed that the conflict between the riparian
Nay. Co., 3 Best & Smith 732, 122 Eng. Rep. 274 (1863); see Note, 23 A.L.R. 757,
759 (1923).
oJohnston v. Bloomfield, 8 Ir. R.C.L. 68 (1867) (by implication).
7See Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 652, 667 (1878). But cf. Johnston v.
Bloomfield, 8 Ir. R.C.L. 68 (1867); Mackenzie v. Bankes, 3 App. Cas. 1324 (1878)
(applying law of Scotland).
SMarshall v. Ulleswater Steam Nay. Co., 3 Best & Smith 732, 122 Eng. Rep. 274
(1863); Johnston v. Bloomfield, 8 Ir. R.C.L. 68 (1867). But see Macdonnell v. Caledonian Canal Comm'rs, 8 Sc. Sess. Cas. 881, 888 (lst Ser. 1830).
9
See Crooked Lake Nay. Co. v. Keuka Nay. Co., 4 N.Y. St. 380, 383 (Sup. Ct.
1887).
o1flroward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909); State v. New, 280 Ill. 393,
117 N.E. 597 (1917); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914)..
"Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125 (1862).
12Boorman v. Sunnuchs, 42 Wis. 233 (1877).
13A "meander" survey skirts the lake in rough fashion as a matter of practical
convenience and omits its area from the survey, but a grantee is presumed to take
title down to the actual shoreline, with such riparian rights as state law prescribes, Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
14Hammond v. Shepard, 186 Ill. 235, 57 N.E. 867 (1900).
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168

owner and the state over title to the bed of waters may well be academic in that state ownership of the soil under the waters preserves
to the public a right little if any greater than that resulting from
riparian ownership of the bed as such with an easement to the public
15
While this reasoning
to use the waters for navigation and fishing.
may have been valid before the advent of modem methods of extracting oil and minerals from subaqueous lands, the recent Tidelands
controversy' 6 illustrates the value of the rights involved in this conflict today.
In general the conflicting holdings of American jurisdictions and
the resulting confusion are traceable to several factors. The vast
difference between the topography of England and that of the United
States-England having very few navigable rivers and lakes of commercial importance-led many courts to declare that the common law
rules were unsuited to this country. While this disparity of quantity,
standing alone, is hardly an adequate reason for overthrowing the
precedents, it becomes cogent when coupled with the unsettled state
of the English common law itself. The greatest confusion, however,
lies in formulating a precise definition of navigable waters. Relatively unimportant as a practical matter in England in determining
title to subaqueous land, largely coastal,1 this problem is most significant in the United States in determining those beds acquired by
the states by virtue of their sovereignty upon admission into the Union
and, conversely, those retained by the United States. At the close of
the American Revolution the thirteen original states succeeded to
the sovereignty of the English Crown and in that character held the
absolute right to all lands within their boundaries."' States subsequently created and "admitted into the Union on equal footing with
the original States, in all respects whatsoever"1 9 acquired all sovereignty, and rights and powers over property, possessed by the original

15See, e.g., Stewart v. Turney, 117 Misc. 398, 402, 191 N.Y. Supp. 342, 344
(Sup. Ct. 1921); Smith v. Rochester, 92 N.Y. 468, 485 (1883).
16United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); for a detailed analysis and
criticism see Parker, Problems in Florida and Other Coastal States Caused by the
California Tidelands Decision, 1 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 44 (1948).
-iSee 1 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §23f (1904).

Ispollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U.S. 1845). This general statement of state
ownership is of course subject to any private ownership preserved by treaty.
195

STAT.

742 (1845).
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states other than those rights specifically withheld by the terms of
admission.20
On March 3, 1845, the Territory of Florida was admitted to the
Union. 2 1 By entering on an equal footing with the original states
it succeeded to the sovereignty of the United States over all lands under navigable bodies of water and all tidelands within its territorial
limits. 2 2 The admitting statute, however, expressly reserves to the
United States the title to all other lands, 2 3 which therefore remained

subject to disposal by Congress;2 4 and this reservation includes the
beds of nonnavigable lakes, 2 5 with which we are primarily concerned

here.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN NAVIGABLE AND NONNAVIGABLE WATERS

It is apparent, then, that any determination of rights to waters
or submerged lands in Florida depends initially upon the question of
navigability. Various definitions of navigable waters have been advanced, but in the majority of jurisdictions and in the federal courts
navigable waters are now defined as those navigable in fact.26 Generally speaking, navigability in fact means susceptibility to use under
normal physical conditions as highways of commerce, over which
trade and travel by water are or may be conducted in at least one of
the customary modes.27 The determination in each case accordingly
2oSee State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 608, 47 So. 353, 356 (1908).
2id. at 610, 47 So. at 355. Cf. 5 STAT. 742 (1845). During the period in which
Florida was a territory the policy of the United States was to hold the lands under
navigable waters for the future state; see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1893).
22State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 610, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908). Although this statement is often repeated in both federal and state decisions, the
law was suddenly abrogated in 1947 as regards the tidelands of coastal states; see
note 16 supra.
23State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 610, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908).
24U.S. CONSr. Art. IV, §3.
25United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
26E.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); The Montello, 20 Wall. 430
(U.S. 1874); The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (U.S. 1870); Bayzer v. McMillan Mill
Co., 105 Ala. 395, 16 So. 923 (1895); Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826
(1909); Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905); People v. System
Properties, 189 Misc. 991, 76 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
27United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); Economy Light & Power Co. v.

United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); Blackman v. Maudlin, 164 Ala. 337, 51 So. 23
(1909); Asselin v. Blount, 65 R.I. 293, 14 A.2d 696 (1940); Taylor Fishing Club
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involves a very close scrutiny of the particular facts and circumstances. 2 The ebb and flow of the tide is not controlling,29 nor
does a finding of navigability require possibility of water transport
either at all seasons of the year 30 or throughout the entire area of
31
the particular body of water.
In Bucki v. Cone32 the Florida Supreme Court substantially approved this general definition of navigability and held the Suwannee
River above White Springs nonnavigable as a matter of law but nevertheless subject to an easement of navigability.33 It correctly disregarded the ebb and flow of tide as a criterion but departed from the
general definition in stating that rivers are considered navigable only
as far upstream as they may be conveniently used at all seasons of
the year by vessels, boats, barges, or other craft for purposes of commerce. The Court distinguished a technical or prima facie navigability, as defined above from an easement of navigability. Under the
latter concept the title to the bed of the stream remains in the riparian owner but is subject to a right of way for commercial purposes.
For example, a stream of sufficient capacity and volume of water to
float to market the products of the countryside satisfies the easement
definition, under which continuous use at all seasons of the year is
34
not essential. Other courts have made this distinction.
Twenty years later in Broward v. Mabry3- the Court, in deciding
that Lake Jackson in Leon County was navigable, ignored this distinction and held that the state in its sovereign capacity had title to

v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Ewell v. Lambert, 177 Va.
222, 13 S.E.2d 333 (1941).
2sUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Bucki
v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
291-he Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (U.S. 1870); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,
12 How. 443 (U.S. 1851); Miami Beach Jockey Club v. Dern, 83 F.2d 715 (D.C.
Cir. 1936); Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927); Clement v. Watson,
63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912); Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214
N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938).
3OUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Hallock
v. Suitor, 37 Ore. 9, 60 Pac. 384 (1900).
3'United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
3225 Fla. 1, 18, 6 So. 160, 161 (1889).
331d. at 1, 6 So. at 160.
3
4E.g., Webster v. Harris, 111 Tenn. 668, 69 S.W. 782 (1902), overruled in part
in State ex rel. Cates v. West Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913).
3558 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
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the bed even though at times large portions of it were dry and were
utilized for raising crops, the lake averaged only two feet in depth,
cattle grazed over most of it, and fords used at all seasons by persons
in buggies or on horseback lay across even its broadest stretches. The
opinion discussed the permanency, size, location, and character of
the lake and particularly stressed its utility for purposes of navigation, fishing, bathing, and commercial intercourse. The result seems
unfortunate in view of the fact that a recognition of the Bucki distinction and a decision that the bed of the lake could pass into
private ownership but that the waters were subject to a public easement for bathing, fishing, and commercial purposes would have protected adequately the rights of the public. 3
Two later decisions merit discussion. Clement v. Watson3 7 held
that tidewaters in a small cove practically surrounded by private land
were nonnavigable, for the reason that navigable waters do not properly embrace those that overlie land not immediately bordering on
navigable waters and that are unsuited to navigation for useful public purposes, for example, mud flats, shallow inlets, and lowlands
barely covered either permanently or at intervals.
The fact that the body of water was a cove, and a small one at
that, probably prompted the above result; for in Martin v. Busch, in
determining the ordinary high water mark of Lake Okeechobee, the
Court said:38
"The navigable waters include lakes, rivers, bays, or harbors,
and all waters capable of practical navigation for useful pur36No federal-state dispute was involved in this Broward case; Florida had
received a federal patent. The opinion reasons that by the law of England the
Crown held title to the beds of navigable waters or tidewaters in trust for the
people of the realm, who had rights of navigation, commerce, fishing, bathing,
and other easements. The original states assumed this trust at the close of the
American Revolution; their control was not granted to the Federal Government
by the Constitution; and Florida, upon its admission to the Union, acquired this
trust over the navigable waters. The nature of the trust prohibited outright disposition of the entire beds to private owners but allowed grants of limited portions
thereof or of limited privileges therein under some circumstances. The applicability of this doctrine to fresh water lakes was questioned in State v. Korrer, 127
Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914); and in Note, 23 A.L.R. 757, 791 (1923), the
whole doctrine is criticized as erroneous. The decision and Note contain extensive consideration of this complex question.
3763 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
3893 Fla. 535, 563, 112 So. 274, 283 (1927).
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172
poses ...

whether the water is navigable or not in all its parts

towards the outside lines or elsewhere ......
Although many state courts have passed on the question of navigability, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
a finding of navigability for the purpose of determining whether subaqueous land passed to a state upon its admission into the Union is
a federal question and is governed by the federal definition of navigability, regardless of susceptibility to navigation in interstate or
foreign commerce.3
The foregoing discussion does not purport to be a comprehensive
treatment of navigability; it is included merely to illustrate the necessity of investigating this basic question in considering any dispute as
to ownership of lake beds in Florida. The Broward v. Mabry decision stands as a warning that seemingly vested property rights may
be destroyed by an adjudication that the waters of a lake are navigable.
RIGHTS IN NONNAVIGABLE WATERS

Assuming that the waters in question are not navigable, the extent of the ownership in the submerged lands and of the rights incident to such ownership depends upon a consideration of two questions:

1. According to the applicable laws of the jurisdiction, can an
upland owner acquire valid title to the abutting submerged
lands?40

39United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S.
64, 75 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliot
Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 583,
591 (1922). Compare the definition applied in United States v. Oregon, supra,
with that employed in Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
40States like Florida, admitted to the Union after the original thirteen, can
properly determine the disposition of such lands with finality in two instances
only: (1) to decide whether a United States patent of land riparian to nonnavigable waters carries, by presumption, title out to the center; and (2) to settle
title disputes concerning land admittedly granted to the states under one of the
numerous land grant acts such as the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Grant Act
of 1850 and the Internal Improvement Lands Grant Act of 1841. See Whitfield,
Political and Legal History of Florida, I FLA. STAT. ANN. cxii (1943).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss2/4

8

Cullis: Extent of Private Rights in Nonnavigable Lakes
NOTES
2. If so, have the conveyances in the chain of title, as construed in
the light of the applicable law, passed the title to the submerged lands to the present owner?
Right to Own
The great majority of American jurisdictions have allowed the
beds of nonnavigable lakes and ponds to pass into private ownership
without serious question,4 ' although several states have deviated from
the common law by constitutional provision or statute. 42 Each state
usually indicates its rule by mere implication; its courts assume,
without specifically deciding, that the submerged land is or is not the
subject of private ownership. Even though the question is somewhat

4'United States v. Phillips, 56 F.2d 447 (D. Neb. 1931) (by implication);
United States v. Ladley, 42 F.2d 474 (N.D. Idaho 1930) (by implication); Person v.
Johnson, 235 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. 1950) (by implication); Earhart v. Rosenwinkel,
108 Ind. App. 281, 25 N.E.2d 268 (1940) (by implication); State v. Nichols, 241
Iowa 952, 44 N.W.2d 49 (1950) (by implication); McDade v. Caplis, 154 La. 1019,
98 So. 625 (1924) (by implication); Bauman. v. Barendregt, 251 Mich. 67, 231
N.W. 70 (1930); Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893); Richardson
v. Sims, 118 Miss. 728, 80 So. 4 (1918); Barcus v. Blanchard, 135 N.J. Eq. 533, 39
A.2d 499 (Ch. 1944) (by implication); Hammel v. Camp Ranger, Inc., 259 App.
Div. 294, 87 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep't 1949) (by implication); Patapsco Guano Co.
v. Bowers-White Lumber Co., 146 N.C. 187, 59 S.E. 538 (1907) (by implication);
State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949); Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St.
336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936)
(by implication); Loughran v. Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879 (1951) (by
implication); Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W. 796 (1915) (by implication); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935);
Monroe v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946); Jennings v. Marston, 121 Va.
79, 92 S.E. 821 (1917); Bernot v. Morrison, 81 Wash. 538, 143 Pac. 104 (1914).
42State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 -N.W.2d 330 (1949) (constitutional provision
that all flowing streams and natural water courses ". . . shall forever remain the
property of the state for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes" held
not to vest absolute ownership but merely a limited property right; statute dedaring government meandered lakes to be navigable held ineffective unless waters
were navigable in fact at time of statehood); Inhabitants of Lynnfield v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 106 N.E. 977 (1914) (provisions of Mass.
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-7 reserving to public the title to ponds of more than
10 acres in public held ineffective against prior conveyances); Conant v. Jordan,
107 Me. 227, 77 Ad. 938 (1910) (rule of Mass. Colonial Ordinance held part of
common law of Maine); Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 25 Ad. 718
(1890) (rule of Mass. Colonial Ordinance held part of common law of N.H.).
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academic in Florida by now, 43 our situation nevertheless involves im-

plication heavily.
Florida has no constitutional or statutory provisions relating to
this specific question. Section 371.02 of Florida Statutes 1951, however, provides that all beds and bottoms of navigable waters shall be
the property of the State of Florida. The reasonable inference from
the omission of nonnavigable waters is that beds and bottoms beneath
such waters are subject to private ownership. In Pounds v. Darling"4
the Florida Supreme Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance
prohibiting bathing in a nonnavigable lake the bed of which was alleged to belong in part to defendant riparian proprietor. Private
ownership of the lake bed was not questioned, and the Court said in
45
holding the ordinance violative of due process:
"... the lake is owned by the persons whose lots border upon
it.... Nor is there any doubt as a matter of law that non-navigable bodies of water may be the subject of private ownership."
Several other cases leave little doubt that Florida has permitted and
46
therefore will continue to permit private ownership.
Whether the respective deeds in the chain of title have by their
terms been effective to convey the full interest of the grantor in nonnavigable lakes and their beds is an important question in determining riparian rights. Several jurisdictions deny a riparian owner any
riparian rights in a lake in which title to the bed is already vested
in another riparian owner.4 7 General discussion of the plethora of
rules for construing deeds is beyond the scope of this analysis, which
confines itself to certain controlling factors. The intent of the grantor,

43Florida itself has conveyed to private owners by statutory authority several
million acres of land, much of which consisted of lakes and ponds, acquired by
Florida under the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Grant Act of September 28,
1850; see Whitfield, supra note 40.
4475 Fla. 125, 77 So. 666 (1918). The city was using the lake water for drinking
purposes and was attempting to prevent pollution.
4sId. at 135, 77 So. at 669.
46See Bannon v. Logan, 66 Fla. 329, 63 So. 454 (1913); Clement v. Watson, 63
Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
47E.g., Loughran v. Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879 (1951); Miller v.
Lutheran Conf. & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 200 Atl. 646 (1938); Lembeck v. Nye,
47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890).
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expressed in the deed or dearly inferable therefrom, is given greatest
weight.-'s When no intent can be ascertained from the deed most
courts presume that it conveys title out to the center of the submerged land,4 9 the theory being that the grantor did not intend to
reserve a strip of land offering no practical value to him after the
conveyance.50 Of course the description must import a boundary
touching the water in order to invoke the presumption. 51
Florida's viewpoint, though not settled, has at least been indicated
by one decision. In Broward v. Mabry,52 alluded to in the discussion
of navigability, the chancellor below held that a United States patent
of land bordering on Lake Jackson to the predecessors of the complainant, without reservation of the submerged lands, conveyed title
to the center of the lake. The Florida Supreme Court obviated consideration of this problem by holding that the lake was navigable and
that the title to its bed had accordingly passed to the state as sovereignty land upon admission of Florida into the Union. The decision
of the chancellor, coupled with the persuasive influence of the accepted common law holding, lends some weight to a prediction that
4SHardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barcus v. Blanchard, 135 N.J. Eq. 533,
39 A.2d 499 (Ch. 1944), afJ'd, 136rNj. Eq. 401, 42 A.2d 271 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945).
49The United States has held that local law determines the extent of a grant by
United States patent of property abutting on nonnavigable waters, Marshall Dental
Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460 (1913); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903);
Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U.S. 406 (1891). This statement has since been limited to an
assumption that the United States has assented to local construction of the patent
provided it exhibits no conflicting intent, United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1
(1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922). A good example of a Florida
decision construing a United States patent is South Florida Farms Co. v. Goodno,
84 Fla. 532, 94 So. 672 (1922).
soUnited States v. Phillips, 56 F.2d 447 (D. Neb. 1931); Earhart v. Rosenwinkle,
108 Ind. App. 281, 25 N.E.2d 268 (1940); Bauman v. Barendregt, 251 Mich. 67,
231 N.W. 70 (1930); Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893);
Richardson v. Sims, 118 Miss. 728, 80 So. 4 (1918); Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State,
76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949); Barcus v. Blanchard, 135 N.J. Eq. 533, 39
A.2d 499 (Ch. 1944), aff'd, 136 N.J. Eq. 401, 42 A.2d 271 (Ct. Err. & App. 1945);
Hammel v. Camp Ranger, Inc., 275 App. Div. 23, 87 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep't 1949);
Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153
Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936) (presumption incorporated in statute); Flisrand v.
Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W. 796 (1915); Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting
Club, Inc. v. Miller Mfg. Co., 117 Va. 129, 83 S.E. 1047 (1915); Litka v. City of
Anacostes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P.2d 88 (1932).
5'Accord, Axline v. Shaw, 35 Fla. 305, 17 So. 411 (1895).
52See notes 35, 36 supra.
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Florida will adopt the general presumption in dealing with beds of
nonnavigable waters.
Right to Use
The riparian rights recognized by the common law are numerous; 53
4
and as a general rule they are the same for both lakes and streams.
The subsequent discussion is limited to the right of an owner of a
portion of the bed of a lake to use the whole lake, although, as we
have seen, this question requires a prior determination of the right
of Florida riparian owners to acquire the bed at all, whether by operation of the general presumption or by the calls of a deed including
portions of the bed of a lake. Assuming the possibility of such acquisition, can each riparian owner use the whole lake for fishing,
boating, and bathing,s5 or is he restricted to those waters overlying
his fee? The various state courts have adopted one of two divergent
views, the common law or the civil. The effort here is to summarize
the two views without, however, presenting an exhaustive analytical
examination of the rationale and history of each.
The common law view restricts each owner to the use of the water
6
immediately overlying his fee and regards any intrusion as a trespass;
in other words, as to dominion no distinction is made between the
land and the water .57 The civil law allows the owner of a portion of
the bed to use the surface of the entire lake for fishing, boating, and
bathing as long as he does not unduly interfere with the rights of
the other proprietors.- s
Ten states have expressed with varying degrees of positiveness
their preference for the common law rule, s 9 while three have indicated
53Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers'
Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909).
54Turner v. James Canal Co., 155 Cal. 82, 99 Pac. 520 (1909); Turner v. Holland,
65 Mich. 453, 33 N.W. 283 (1887); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617
(1914); Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114 (1925).
5sThe decisions usually speak of the different uses loosely and commingle them;
see, e.g., Mix v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y. Supp. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
56Smoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa. 146, 58 Atl. 144 (1904).
5TLamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902).
5sMackenzie v. Bankes, 3 App. Cas. 1324 (1878); see Hardin v. Jordan, 140
U.S. 371, 390 (1890).
59Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934) (boating, bathing, and
fishing); Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902) (hunting and boat-
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adoption or possible recognition of the civil law rule.60 One state
apparently recognizes both doctrines. 61 The decisions are practically
devoid of any rationale. Indeed, many courts, especially those that
have adopted the common law viewpoint, fail to recognize even the
possibility of any conflict on the question;6 2 they simply declare, without analysis, that the common law rule obtains in their state. 63 Only
one state, Michigan, has unequivocally adopted the civil law rule,
primarily because of the difficulty of making definite extensions into
the lake of the property lines of the various riparian owners.6 4 A
Mississippi dictum 65 approving the Michigan decisions characterizes
such a rule as ".... in accordance with what has been the generally
observed custom and rule of conduct among the people in this state
for time out of mind ......
The Michigan and Mississippi opinions present a strong argument for adoption of the civil law view. In any event, one would
logically expect a state that maintains title to the bed of a navigable
lake in itself as trustee for its people and refuses to let title pass into
private ownership to be favorably disposed toward adoption of .the
civil law rule. Such is not the case, however; the common law view

ing); Walden v. Pines Lake Land Co., 126 N.J. Eq. 249, 8 A.2d 581 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1939) (by implication, any use); Mix v. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y. Supp.
441 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (any use); Akron Canal & Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio
App. 93, 50 N.E.2d 897 (1943) (fishing and boating); Smoulter v. Boyd, 209 Pa.
146, 58 Atl. 144 (1904) (boating); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (fishing and boating); accord, Great Hill Lake, Inc. v.
Caswell, 126 Conn. 364, 11 A.2d 396 (1940) (artificial lake-fishing, boating, and
518, 181 N.E. 399 (1932); State v. West
bathing); cf. Leonard v. Pearce, 348 Ill.
Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746 (1913).
6
oBurt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.V.2d 117 (1946) (any use); cf. Greisinger
v. Klinhardt, 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W.2d 978 (1928); State Game & Fish Comm'n v.
Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 564, 569, 193 So. 9, 11, 13 (1940).
GiTaylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (indicating that civil law applies when riparian owner has implied title to bed of
a lake by operation of general presumption, ,but holding that owner has absolute
title and common law rule applies when deed calls for lines cutting through lake).
62Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902); Smoulter v. Boyd, 209
Pa. 146, 58 Atl. 144 (1904).
63E.g., Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934); Smoulter v. Boyd,
supra note 62.
64Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919).
asSee State Game & Fish Conm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 564, 193 So.

9, 11 (1940).
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apparently prevails in all four of the jurisdictions of this type that
have faced the problem of choosing between the civil and common
law rules. 66
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for the civil law rule is its
practicability. Many of Florida's lakes are relatively small and are
used exclusively for private recreational purposes. To restrict each
owner to his own waters seriously curtails, and in some locations even
prohibits, certain sports. The effect on the water skier and the sailing
enthusiast is obvious. Restrained by a "reasonable use" limitation,
however, each riparian owner can benefit from the whole lake and
yet have his remedy against neighbors that indulge in improper use.
On the other hand, the common law view offers some commercial advantages; 67 and of course the standard arguments supporting nonabrogation of any common law rule apply here with equal force.
Turning with misgivings to a search for the rule in
Florida, the ironic specter of 30,000 lakes and no case law arises. A
study of the decisions and statutes relating in any way to lakes furnishes few if any clues to the position that the Florida Supreme Court
will take when faced with the problem. Our adoption of the common law of England will manifestly constitute an argument in favor
of accepting the common law theory, although topographically Florida
and England have little in common. A century ago, when our English
legal heritage commanded greater recognition and when individual
rights in property were held in higher esteem than public rights, the
civil law theory would no doubt have received less favorable consideration. Today, however, public rights are assuming increasing
prominence, and adoption of this rule would not only bestow by law
greater practical benefits upon the common owners of the typical
Florida lake but would in fact do little more than confirm the general
practice followed for many decades in Florida.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion several principles assume particular
prominence in the examination of title to lake beds and the rights

-tMinn., Pa., and possibly Ill. and Tenn.; see note 59 supra.
GiSee Sanders v. DeRose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 531 (1934) (defendant enjoined
from fishing in waters of plaintiff, who received his income from boats rented
for pleasure, including fishing).
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